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Human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry 
(HFACS-OGI) 
Abstract 
The oil and gas industry has been beset with several catastrophic accidents, most of which have been 
attributed to organisational and operational human factor errors. The current HFACS developed for the 
aviation industry, cannot be used to simultaneously analyse regulatory deficiencies and emerging violation 
issues, such as sabotage in the oil and gas industry. This paper presents an attempt to improve the existing 
HFACS investigation tool and proposes a novel HFACS named the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System for the Oil and Gas Industry (HFACS-OGI). Results found the HFACS-OGI system to 
be suitable for categorising accidents, following the analysis of 11 accident reports from the US Chemical 
Safety Board (US CSB). The HFACS-OGI system moreover revealed some significant relationships 
between the different categories. Furthermore, the results indicated that failures in national and international 
industry regulatory standards would automatically create the preconditions for accidents to occur. 
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1. Introduction 
The process industry has experienced some devastating accidents and statistics have shown that these are 
mostly attributed to human factors [1, 2]. For example the Bhopal toxic release (1984), one of the worst 
industry disasters, resulted in 2500–6000 fatalities and over 200,000 in- juries [3] . The Flixborough 
explosion (1974) caused 28 fatalities and the near total annihilation of the NYPRO plant [4] . The BP 
Texas City refinery explosion (2005) resulted in around 15 fatalities [5] and the Piper Alpha offshore oil 
industry disaster (1988) left 167 dead and dozens badly injured [6]. These have all been investigated and 
found to be a result of both direct and indirect human factor failings. Studies have shown that some of the 
investigative tools and measures adopted were not robust enough to avoid accidents, especially in an 
industry prone to risks and accidents. Shappell and Wiegmann therefore assert that it is imperative to take 
accident investigation beyond the actions of immediate personnel [7]. An attempt to accomplish this 
resulted in the development of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) by 
Shappell and Wiegmann, for use in the investigation of US military aviation accidents [8–11]. The 
framework was based on James Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model which explained the occurrence of system 
failure at four levels: 1) Organisational failures, 2) Unsafe supervision, 3) Pre- conditions for unsafe acts 
and 4) Unsafe acts. The framework uses a systems approach to identify deficiencies that have led to an 
accident rather than focusing on and blaming the individuals involved [11, 12]. Whilst the HFACS 
framework was originally developed and applied successfully in the analysis of aviation accidents [11], 
other industries have also successfully used the original framework, or a modified version, in accidents 
analysis. These include the maritime and railway industries and medical organisations [13–18] . Table 1 
shows that the HFACS framework as it was originally constituted has been modified for use in several 
different sectors. 
The existing HFACS is effective for the analysis of human factors, particularly as it relates to safety 
culture, management commitment, safety leadership [25] , organisational erosive drift [26] , technical 
failure of ageing equipment and the operators’ lack of knowledge or competency [26,27] . It cannot 
however simultaneously analyses regulatory deficiencies [28, 29] and emerging violation issues like 
sabotage, in response to problematic organisational factors particular to the oil and gas industry [17]. At 
present, there is no Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) specifically designed for 
the oil and gas industry. A HFACS framework specifically for accident analysis in the oil and gas industry 
therefore would be particularly advantageous. 
 
 
Table 1: List of HFACS Modifications for the Development of HFACS-OGI 
Studies Author(S) Sector  HFACS 
Version 
Key Modifications   
A human and organisational 
factors (HOFs) analysis 
method for marine casualties 
using HFACS-Maritime 
Accidents (HFACS-MA) 
[15] 
 
 
Marine HFACS-MA The fifth level added with 
legislation gaps, 
administration oversight and 
design gaps as categories. 
Use of HFACS-FCM in fire 
prevention modeling on board 
ships 
 [18] Shipping HFACS-FCM  
Operator error and system 
deficiencies: Analysis of 508 
mining incidents and accidents 
from Queensland, Australia 
using HFACS 
[19] Mining  HFACS-MI The addition of the fifth 
level called outside factors 
with regulatory factors and 
others as categories. 
Application of a human error 
framework to conduct train 
accident/incidents 
investigations 
[17] Railroad HFACS-RR The addition of the fifth 
level called outside factors 
with two categories called 
regulatory oversight and 
economic/political/social/leg
al environment. The addition 
of acts of sabotage in 
operator acts level. 
The Human Factors Analysis 
Classification System 
(HFACS) Applied to Health 
Care 
[12] Healthcare Modified- 
HFACS 
Substituting some categories 
at preconditions for unsafe 
acts level with the fitness of 
duty, chronic performance 
limitation. 
Developing the understanding 
of underlying causes of 
construction fatal accidents 
[20] Construction Modified- 
HFACS 
The addition of a fifth level 
called external influences 
with the following 
categories: political 
influences, regulatory 
influences, market 
influences, and social 
influences.   
Evaluation of the Human 
Factors Analysis and 
Classification System as a 
Predictive Model 
[21] Aviation Modified -
HFACS 
The addition of a fifth level 
called outside influence with 
the following categories: 
maintenance issues, 
airport/airport personnel, 
regulatory impact, air traffic 
issues and other person 
involvement. 
Evaluation of the HFACS-
ADF safety classification 
system: Inter-coder consensus 
and intra-coder consistency 
[22] Aviation HFACS-ADF The addition of a category 
called defences. 
Helicopter maintenance error 
analysis: Beyond the third 
order of the HFACS-ME 
[23] Aviation HFACS-ME The modification includes 
the addition of maintainer 
conditions. 
Helicopter maintenance error 
analysis: Beyond the 
third order of the HFACS-ME 
[24] Aviation HFACS-ME The modification includes 
the addition of 
maintainer conditions 
 
2.0 Analysis of proposed framework for the oil and gas industry (HFACS-OGI) 
Original HFACS was based on Reasons theory of accident causation. However, HFACs has been modified 
to fit specific industries and applications. The proposed HFACS-OGI took into consideration oil and gas 
technical reports like the 2014 SPE technical report ‘The Human Factor: Process Safety and Culture’ 
produced after a two-day summit held in July 2012 on human factors as it affects the oil and gas industry and 
the best way forward[7]. Proposed changes focused on preventing catastrophic accident, particularly toxic 
releases, fire and explosion associated with Control of major accident hazards (COMAH) regulations 
(1999)[29].    
 
2.1. Unsafe Acts   (Level 1) 
The Health and Safety Executive defines an unsafe act as: “any act that deviates from a generally recognized 
safe way or specified method of doing a job and increases the potential of an accident” [30]. Unsafe acts as 
shown in the proposed HFACS-OGI ( Fig. 2 ) could be as a result of error by omission (where a required action 
was disregarded) or error by commission (where an incorrect action was performed) [31] . In both cases, these 
errors are unintentional and unplanned. In the case of violation however, the error is intentional although 
usually the perpetrators perceived they had a better idea, a quicker process, superior knowledge or a different 
way to accomplish a given task. Sometimes violations occur due to the impression that there are too many 
layers of protection which are bypassed with no intention to cause deliberate harm.  
 
2.1.1. Act of Sabotage 
An act of sabotage suggests intentionality. It may be defined as a deliberate act to negatively affect the system, 
process, work or produc- tion in a plant, system, factory or workplace that may lead to a serious accident or 
damage, in response to a challenging identified organisa- tional factor [17] . In this form of violation, all layers 
of protection are deliberately removed to cause harm.  
There are two main theories that have been advanced to explain how water entered Tank 610 in the 
Bhopal disaster: 1) water-washing of the pipes and 2) sabotage [32] . The second theory states that an act of 
sabotage by an aggrieved employee in response to organisational is- sues caused one of the world’s worst 
process safety accidents. Kalelkar and Little [33] argued in support of the second theory that although “minor 
incidents of process sabotage by employees had occurred pre- viously at the Bhopal plant, and, indeed, occur 
from time to time in industrial plants all over the world…it was during a shift change that a disgruntled 
operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, 
with the inten- tion of contaminating and spoiling the tank’s contents. ”[33] . Opera- tors’ acts of sabotage can 
take different forms: working slowly, destroy- ing equipment and polluting the system among others. Such 
interven- tions in normal operational procedures might result in severe conse- quences like fire, major 
explosions, toxic releases and environmental contamination [34] .  
Although it was only after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City that the chemical industries 
included sabotage in their formal risk as- sessments [34] , it is essential to differentiate between acts of 
sabotage and terrorist attacks. An act of sabotage is an internal act carried out by a disgruntled employee in 
response to a challenging organisational issue. A terrorist act on the other hand is mostly an external act car- 
ried out by terrorists for any reason. They are therefore different both in the nature of the perpetrator and the 
reason for the act. The Centre for Chemical Process Safety has developed a guideline in its new initia- tive on 
sabotage risk in the process industry “[ that ]…demonstrates pro- cess and tools for managing the security 
vulnerability of sites that pro- duce and handle chemicals, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals, and related 
materials…”[35] . This study therefore introduces a third viola- tion subcategory named “acts of sabotage ”. 
However, this is related to the violation issue only insomuch as the act was internal and intended to trigger a 
domino effect within the process plant in response to an identified challenging organisational factor. This was 
also considered in HFACS-RR [17] . 
 2.2 Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (Level 2) 
The preconditions for unsafe acts are linked to the categories of the Hawkins SHEL model where interaction 
between software, hardware, environment and liveware are considered factors that may create conditions for 
unsafe acts [36]. These interactions are represented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
Figure 1: the SHEL Interactions 
 
2.2.1. Contractor Environment 
With respect to the original HFACS, the environmental factors were related only to physical and 
technological factors, some of which could be addressed within the context of a single company. The 
extensive use of contractor services and partnerships however, with their associated physical and 
technological environmental factors, has created a critical industry-wide problem. As a result, on average 
contract workers have consistently recorded a higher rate of fatal accidents (FAR) than company workers 
over the same period [37]. Moreover, the task errors associated with contractor accidents are to a greater 
extent due to physical and technological factors. The oil and gas industry operates with inputs from both 
short and long-term contractors which account for over 75% of hours worked in the industry worldwide [38]. 
Failures from contractors have been known to contribute to the majority of cases involving accidents in the 
industry [7, 37, and 38]. This is because contractors are not permanent employees of any organisation and 
therefore may face challenges in adapting to a new working environment. Contractors may also have 
difficulties in adapting and merging their work patterns and safety cultures to that expected of them by the 
host organisation. These limitations may create the conditions for unsafe acts that may lead to accidents. 
Therefore, we considered it necessary for the oil and gas industry to properly address this challenge. 
 
2.2.2. Individual and Team Capacity 
Liveware 
Software Environment 
Hardware  
The HFACS-OGI’s category of individual and team capacity represents the physical, psychological and 
mental capacities of employees. With respect to the original HFACS, this category covers the operators’ 
conditions in addition to the training and certification needs of the team. The oil and gas industry however 
requires individuals and teams with both technical and interpersonal skills to ensure that teams function 
effectively for safe operations [7]. 
 
2.3 Organisational Influences (Level 4) 
2.3.1.  Management of Change 
Organisational influences, as constituted in the original HFACS, deal with “…decision[s] of upper 
management around three issues: 1) re- sources management, 2) organisational climate and 3) operational 
process…” [10]. However, with respect to the process industry and its safety management standards, the 
management of change refers to modifications (other than “replacement in kind ”) to chemical processes, 
technology, equipment, procedures and changes to a facility that affect a covered process [39] . 
Significantly, many of the catastrophic events that have occurred on oil and gas facilities are attributable to 
the management of change [6]. There have also been numerous deficiencies in off shore process systems 
arising from the failure to effectively plan, communicate and coordinate process changes. When changes are 
not communicated properly and managed effectively, it could result in the conditions for accidents to occur 
[7, 40–44]. We have therefore added “management of change” as a subset of “organisational influences” to 
address the management of change as it relates to:  
 
1. Process hardware / software modifications  
2. Temporary process changes  
3. Operating procedures changes  
4. Process organisational changes 
 
 2.3.2. Process Safety Culture 
Although there are similarities and some overlapping in the approaches to managing occupational 
safety and process safety, there are also significant differences due to their respective focus areas. 
Traditional occupational safety focuses on employees’ health and safety in the workplace, for example slip, 
trip and fall, being hit by an object, getting caught in machinery, etc. Process safety however focuses on 
chemical releases, fires and explosions inherent in the process industry that can lead to catastrophic 
accidents. It has been noted that companies that do not have a distinctive process safety management 
programme tend to pay less attention to the process safety aspect of risk management, hence increasing the 
likelihood of catastrophic accidents. Following a number of industrial disasters including ‘the 1984 Bhopal, 
India, incident resulting in more than 2000 deaths; the October 1989 Phillips Petroleum Company, Pasadena, 
TX, incident resulting in 23 deaths and 132 injuries; the July 1990 BASF, Cincinnati, OH, incident resulting 
in 2 deaths, and the May 1991 IMC, Sterlington, LA, incident resulting in 8 deaths and 128 injuries ”; there 
has been an increased focus on the organisational process safety cultures associated with major accident 
hazards [29] . The Process Safety Leadership Group (PSLG) in their final report on the Buncefield incident 
advocated that the organisation should “develop a distinct programme for the promotion of process safety to 
support the maintenance of a positive process safety culture.”[45, 46]. In July 1990, The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) published Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
(July 1990), a proposed standard in the Federal Register (55 FR29150) . The standard emphasised the 
requirement of a distinct hazard management associated with highly dangerous chemicals [39]. The UK 
Health and Safety Executive also developed distinct process safety indicators: a step-by-step guide for 
chemical and major hazard industries known as HSG254 [47]. The Control of Major Accident Hazards 
Regulations 1999 (COMAH) is a distinct set of regulations designed to ensure adequate emergency planning 
is in place for major accidents in the process industry [48] . The Competent Authority Strategic Management 
Group noted that a “board- level visibility and promotion of process safety leadership is essential to set a 
positive safety culture throughout an organisation [45]”. There- fore, “process safety culture” has been 
introduced, a category distinct from organisational climate and designed to 
 
2.4 Regulatory & Statutory Influences (Level 5) 
The contribution of factors in major accidents that go beyond the organisational level [49] was 
identified in the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) blowout of 2010 [50]. The accident killed 11 and released an 
estimated 4.1–4.6 million barrels (650,000 m 3) of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (Prouty et al., 2016). The 
DWH Study Group found that while this particular disaster involved organisational failures, it also 
transcended them: “this disaster involves an international industry and its governance. “This is similar to the 
level covering the industry governance or public governmental agencies [15, 20, and 51]. Regulatory and 
statutory influences or “industry-governance-management” are mainly concentrated on deficiencies with 
respect to national and international standards.  
The first category in this level, which identifies deficiencies in cur- rent industry standards and 
approved codes of conducts, is named “international industry standards ”while the second category is named 
the “national regulatory framework ”. The lack of industry-governance- management (national and 
international) in the oil and gas industry facilitates a progressive reduction in preventative barriers enabling 
in- appropriate cost cutting [50]. This environment can create preconditions for unsafe acts, similar to those 
in the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) blowout of 2010 [50]. 
3 Accident analysis using the new framework 
The evaluation study to assess the suitability and to investigate key relationships between the 
categories of HFACS-OGI was conducted using major accidents that have occurred in the USA 
refineries. The International Association of Oil and Gas Procedures (OGP) defines major accidents as 
follows [52]: 
i. multiple fatalities  
ii. ii. for offshore facility: total loss of the unit including constructive total loss from an insurance 
point of view, however, the unit may be repaired and put into operation again or severe damage 
to one or more modules of the unit; large /medium damage to loading bearing structure; major 
damage to major essential equipment.  
iii.  For onshore facility: approximately USD 100 M property damage or 1000 barrel of oil spilt 
[52]. In order to evaluate the HFACS-OGI framework, 11 refinery accident reports between 
1998 and 2012 with at least one fatality or had extensive damage to the facility were retrieved 
from the CSB accident database. Refinery incidents that occurred due to natural causes (e.g. 
flooding, hurricane) were excluded. 
 
In order to evaluate the HFACS-OGI framework, 11 refinery acci- dent reports between 1998 and 
2012 with at least one fatality or had extensive damage to the facility were retrieved from the CSB accident 
database. Refinery incidents that occurred due to natural causes (e.g. flooding, hurricane) were excluded. 
 
3.1 Coding Process and Analysis 
Publically available U.S. refinery accident reports were coded based on the original 19 categories of 
HFACS and the 26 proposed categories of HFACS-OGI, as shown in Fig. 2. The coding identified the causal 
factors in each HFACS and HFACS-OGI category that contributed to these accidents. Each report was 
carefully read before the coding process for HFACS and HFACS-OGI. Each given category was coded 1 to 
indicate its presence or 0 to indicate its absence, as illustrated in Table 2. Although an accident may be 
caused by a combination of several factors, each particular unsafe act identified from the accident report was 
coded distinctly, considering all the subcategories of HFACS and HFACS-OGI. The coded data was then 
cross-tabulated for statistical analysis and any categories that were not present in any of the accidents were 
excluded. The SPSS version 22 for Windows was used to calculate the Chi-square test of association and 
Fisher’s exact test in order to determine the statistical association between the upper-level categories and the 
adjacent lower level categories [14, 40, and 41]. Further analysis was conducted using Spearman’s 
correlation [42] to measure the strength of the relationships between the different categories that showed 
significant relationships in the Chi-square and Fisher’s exact test 
Table 2 
Illustration of the sequence of HFACS categories/subcategories identiﬁed from the accident/incident reports. 
Year Accident ID Organisational inﬂuences   Level 1 
  Resource  management Organisational climate Organisational 
process 
Total 1 
2001 2001A 0 1 1 2 
2001 2001B 1 0 0 1 
2000 2000A 0 0 1 1 
2000 2000B 0 0 0 0 
2000 2000C 0 0 0 0 
2000 2000D 0 0 0 0 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Assessment of external Contribution to Accident Causation 
The review of 11 refinery accidents using HFACS and HFACS-OGI is presented in Tables 3 and 4, 
showing the frequency of each of the identified contributory factors.  
In identifying and describing the different causal factors in the 11 accidents reviewed (Tables 3 and 
4), 54 categories of occurrences were identified with the HFACS, but a total of 80 were identified with 
HFACS- OGI. All industry specific categories which were difficult to identify with the HFACS were 
successfully identified using the HFACS-OGI.  
The organisational process (level 4) was identified as a contributing factor in 90% of the accidents 
with a frequency of 10 each for both HFACS and HFACS-OGI. Process safety culture (HFACS-OGI level 
4) was identified as a contributing factor in 63% of the accidents with a frequency of 7, while organisational 
climate, resource management (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 4) and crew resource management (HFACS & 
HFACS-OGI level 2) were identified in 54% of accidents as contributing factors with a frequency of 6. 
Insufficient leadership support for a positive process safety culture was identified as a general factor in the 
process safety culture category. The lack of policies and procedures were common factors in the category of 
organisational process while failure to provide sufficient resources for the procurement of equipment and 
bud- get cuts were common failures in the resource management category. The common factors identified in 
crew resource management include in- sufficient workforce, poor team communication, poor job planning 
and a lack of teamwork. The contributing factors identified in 45% of the accidents include industry 
standards (HFACS-OGI level 5), management of change (HFACS- OGI level 4), contractor environment 
(HFACS-OGI level 2) and decision errors (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 1) with a frequency occurrence of 
5 each. The common factors identified in the management of change category were the failure to conduct 
sufficient management of change re- views for process hardware / software modifications and the lack of up- 
dated operating procedures following modification. This demonstrates the importance of adding this 
category to HFACS-OGI. The factors identified in the contractor environment included the failure of the 
contractor to follow client workplace procedures and poor quality of services. The inability to make safe 
decisions to produce desired results was common in decision errors. 
 The contributing factors identified in 36% of the accidents include the national regulatory 
framework (HFACS-OGI level 5), inadequate supervision (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 3) and supervisory 
violations (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 3) with a frequency occurrence of 4 each.  
The common factors identified in the HFACS-OGI national regulatory framework category were 
failures in administrative duties such as inspections and the enforcement of regulations, in addition to 
inadequate regulatory standards.  
A lack of sufficient supervision and support was common in all accidents that had inadequate 
supervision as one of their contributing factors. The failure to follow the rules and procedures by supervisors 
was the most common failure in the supervisory violation category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proposed framework for HFACS-OGI 
 
Unsafe Supervision 
(Level 3) 
Supervisory 
Violations 
Planned 
Inappropriate 
Operations 
Inadequate 
Supervision 
Failed to 
Correct Known 
Problem 
International Industry 
Standards 
National Regulatory 
Framework 
Regulatory & Statutory Influences  
(Level 5) 
Organisational Influences 
(Level 4) 
Organisational 
Process 
 Management of 
Change  
Resource 
Management 
Organisational 
Climate 
Process Safety 
Culture 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
(Level 2) 
Adverse 
mental 
states 
Physical 
mental 
limitations 
Adverse 
physiological 
states 
Individual and team 
capacity Team Capacity 
Crew 
resource 
managemen
t 
Personal 
readiness 
Personnel Factors 
Physical 
Environment 
Contractor                 
Environment 
Technological 
Environment 
Environmental Factors 
Unsafe Acts       
(Level 1) 
Violation
s 
Routine Exceptional Acts of 
Sabotage 
Decision 
Errors  
Skill-based 
Errors 
Perpetual 
Errors 
Errors 
  Table 3:  
Breakdown of accident/incident contributing to HFACS categories 
 
HFACS Level 
 
Subcategory 
 
Number of cases 
identified per contributing 
subcategory  
 
*Percentage 
% 
Level 4 
Organisational 
influences  
Organisational process 10 90 
Organisational climate 6 54 
Resource management 6 54 
Level 3 
Unsafe 
supervision 
Inadequate supervision 4 36 
Planned inappropriate operations 2 18 
Failed to correct a known problem  1 9 
Supervisory Violations 4 36 
Level 2 
Preconditions 
for unsafe acts 
Physical environment 1 9 
Technological environment 2 18 
Adverse mental states 1 9 
Adverse physiological states 0 - 
Physical/ mental limitations  0 - 
Crew resource management  6 54 
Personal readiness 1 9 
Level 1 
Unsafe acts  
Decision errors 5 45 
Skill-based errors 1 9 
Perceptual errors 1 9 
Routine violations 2 18 
Exceptional violations 1 9 
*The column labelled percentage reflects the overall percentage among all cases. Note that the percentage will not equal 100%, because in many 
cases far more than one causal factor was associated with the accident 
Three contributory factors were identified in 18% of the accidents including planned inappropriate 
operations (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 3), the technological environment (HFACS & HFACS-OGI level 2) 
and routine violations (HFACS and HFACS-OGI level 1) with a frequency occurrence of 2 each. The failure to 
plan work in a safe manner and the issuing of inadequate work permits were the issues found in planned 
inappropriate operations. The failure of alarms and critical safety dis- play systems were identified in the 
technology environment category, while failure to follow work procedures as general practice in carrying out 
certain tasks was identified in the routine violations category.  
The contributing factors with a 9% presence in the accidents were as follows: the failure to correct 
known problem (HFACS and HFACS-OGI level 3), the physical environment and adverse mental states 
(HFACS and HFACS-OGI level 2), skill-based errors, perceptual errors and exceptional violation (HFACS and 
HFACS-OGI level 1) with a frequency occurrence of 1 each. The failure of duty supervisors to control known 
existing hazards prior to maintenance was identified under the failure to correct a known problem, the main 
failure in the physical environment involved operators working at a height without safety precautions along 
with ignition sources. The inability to follow procedures due to the pressure of time was found in the 
exceptional violations category.  
The three categories not included in the results are adverse physiological states, physical/mental 
limitations (HFACS and HFACS-OGI level 2) and acts of sabotage (HFACS-OGI level 1), because they were 
not identified as contributing factors in the accidents under analysis. The results show the presence of industry 
standards and national regulatory framework failures in some of the accidents reviewed. This may not have 
been possible with the application of the original HFACS because it does not provide a category for industry 
standards and the national regulatory framework, or a level to consider other factors.  
International standards and national regulatory framework categories were identified as contributing 
factors in some accidents and this reaffirms similar findings in recent studies [14, 15, 19, and 53]. This 
indicates that sufficient regulatory responsibility is particularly important in the oil and gas industry. Not all 
accidents however have industry standards and national regulatory framework failures as contributing factors, 
as discovered by other researchers [17, 20]. 
The key failures identified in level 4 of HFACS-OGI were a lack of financial resources and inadequate 
procedures including the lack of procedures for certain aspects of the operations. These identified factors are 
consistent with findings from other researchers, as this indicates that failures at this level contribute to 
accidents [18, 53].  
Overall, these findings validate the application of HFACS-OGI as an effective human factor analysis 
tool in accident investigation for the oil and gas industry.  
The results indicate that 50% of the contributing factors identified in the 11 accidents reviewed are 
latent failures in level 2 and level 4, this shows that it is possible for the failures created at higher levels to 
remain in the system for a considerable time without being noticed, thereby creating conditions for accidents to 
occur during operations [54,55] .  
 
4.1.1. Evaluation of the relationships between HFACS and HFACS-OGI levels  
This section provides the results and discussion regarding the evaluation of the relationships between 
upper-level categories and adjacent downward level categories in the HFACS and HFACS-OGI frameworks. A 
summary of results showing only the significant associations from the Chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. The summary results for Spearman’s correlation, conducted only for HFACS OGI, 
are shown in Table 7 including details of the strengths of association. Although the HFACS analysis identified 
some significant associations in the 11 refinery accidents, the number and strength of significant associations 
identified using the HFACS-OGI validate the efficiency of its application in the oil and gas industry.  
The significant association paths based on the Chi-square test and Fisher’s exact test between the upper 
the level and adjacent downward level categories in the HFACS-OGI framework are illustrated in Fig. 3 .  
Fig. 3 shows a representation of all the findings of the Chi-square test of association, Fisher’s exact test 
and Spearman’s correlation test from level 5 to level 1. For example, there was a significant association 
between the national regulatory framework (level 5) and organisational climate (level 4) (r = 0.022, p < 0.05). 
Fisher’s exact test was statistically significant (r = 0.015, p < 0.05). Spearman’s correlation test between the 
national regulatory framework (level 5) and the organisational climate (level 4) showed a very strong positive 
association (r = 0.690, p < 0.01). Fig. 3 shows that some categories were statistically significant in the Chi-
square test of association but not all categories were significant in Fisher’s exact test and Spearman’s 
correlation. Spearman’s correlation (Table 7) however also provided a type of association between the various 
categories. 
4.1.2. The Chi-square test, Fisher’s exact test and Spearman’s correlation analysis The Chi-square test, 
Fisher’s exact test and Spearman’s correlation analysis of the categories in the different HFACS-OGI and 
HFACS levels have demonstrated varying statistical associations between the different levels, some of which 
are common to safety critical domains as identified by previous HFACS analysis. 
The level 5 failures involving the national regulatory framework demonstrate the potential of these 
external factors to create the conditions where organisations are unable to put in place effective structures based 
on best practices and regulations. These industry standards and national regulations could have provided the 
reference guidelines for communication, delegation of authority, human resources policies, positive norms, 
organisational customs, values and beliefs to enable them to operate safely, but deficiencies of industry codes 
and national regulations have been identified as key factors that may both prevent and also contribute to 
accidents [17, 19, and 56]. According to Olsen and Shamrock [22], external factors such as regulations may 
influence certain aspects of the organisational process. This indicates that regulations may affect categories in 
level 4, as seen in this study. The deficiencies in national regulatory frameworks may create a conducive 
environment for accidents at the top level of the organisation because top management may lack direction on 
best practices [15]. However, national regulatory frameworks may also create regulations and standards to 
enable organisations to reduce and prevent accidents [57]. The management of change failure in level 4 may 
lead to inadequate supervision and potentially serious consequences.  
The failures of inadequate supervision, the failure to correct known problems and planned 
inappropriate operations on three level 2 and level 3 categories demonstrates the importance of adequate 
supervision, especially in the management of individual and team capacity in the execution of tasks. The path 
of significant association reveals this connection. It may also affect the way individuals and team members 
handle process changes in the workplace, together with their ability to make decisions based on the risk 
perception profile of both the supervisor and the entire team. This further validates the importance of effective 
supervisory arrangements in an organisation as a vital factor in the prevention of accidents because inadequate 
supervision has been identified as a causal factor in accidents [58, 59].  
 
 
 
Table 4:  
Breakdown of accident/incident contributing to HFACS-OGI categories 
HFACS –OGI  
Subcategory 
Number of cases 
identified per contributing 
factor 
*Percentage 
% 
Level 5 
Regulatory & 
Statutory 
Influences 
 
Industry standards 
National regulatory framework 
 
5 
4 
 
45 
36 
Level 4 
Organisational 
Influences 
 
Organisational climate 
Process safety culture 
Organisational process 
Management of Change 
Resource management 
 
6 
7 
10 
5 
6 
 
54 
63 
90 
45 
54              
Level 3 
Unsafe 
Supervision 
Inadequate supervision 4 36 
Planned inappropriate operations 2 18 
Failed to correct a known problem  1 9 
Supervisory Violations 4 36 
Level 2 
Preconditions 
for Unsafe 
Acts 
Physical environment 1 9 
Technological environment 2 18 
Contractor environment 5 45 
Adverse mental states 1 9 
Adverse physiological states 0 - 
Physical / mental limitations 0 - 
Crew resource management 6 54 
Personal readiness 1 9 
Level 1 
Unsafe Acts 
Decision errors 5 45 
Skill-based errors 1 9 
Perceptual errors 1 9 
Routine violations 2 18 
Exceptional violations 1 9 
Acts of sabotage 0 - 
*The column labelled percentage reflects the overall percentage among all cases. Note that the percentage will not equal 100%, because in many 
cases far more than one causal factor was associated with the accident 
 
Table 5:  
* Comparison of Chi-Square and Fisher’s Exact Test Results between levels of HFACS framework  
A significant association between the upper 
level and adjacent downward level categories 
in the HFACS framework. 
P-values less than 0.05 indicate a significant 
relationship between categories. 
Chi-square Fisher’s exact test 
P-value 
 
Significance 
P<0.05 
P-value Significance 
P<0.05 
Inadequate supervision Technological 
environment 
0.039 Yes 0.109 No 
Inadequate supervision  Crew resource 
management 
0.022 Yes  0.061 No  
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
Physical 
environment 
0.026 Yes 0.182 No 
Failed to correct known 
problem 
Physical 
environment 
0.001 Yes 0.091 No 
Physical Environment Skilled Based 0.001 Yes  0.091 No  
Errors  
Technological Environment  Perceptual 
Errors  
0.026 Yes  0.182 No  
Adverse Mental States Perceptual 
Errors 
0.001 Yes  0.091 No 
Adverse Mental States Routine 
Violations 
0.026 Yes  0.182 No  
Personal Readiness Perceptual 
Errors 
0.001 Yes  0.091 No 
Personal Readiness  Routine 
Violations 
0.026 Yes  0.182 No  
 
Table 6:  
* Comparison of Chi-Square and Fisher’s Exact Test Results between levels of HFACS-OGI framework 
A significant association between the upper level and 
adjacent downward level categories in the HFACS-
OGI framework. 
 P-values less than 0.05 indicate a significant 
relationship between categories. 
Chi-square Fisher’s  exact test 
P-
value 
 
Sig 
P<0.05 
P-
value 
 
Sig 
P<0.05 
National regulatory framework Organisational 
climate 
0.022 Yes 0.061 No 
Management of Change Inadequate 
Supervision 
0.006   Yes 0.015 Yes 
Inadequate supervision Technological 
environment 
0.039 Yes 0.109 No 
Inadequate supervision Crew Resource 
Management 
0.022 Yes 0.061 No 
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
Physical 
Environment 
0.026 Yes 0.182 No 
Failed to Correct Known 
Problem 
Physical 
Environment 
0.001 Yes 0.091 No 
Physical Environment Skill-Based Errors 0.001 Yes 0.091 No 
Technological Environment  Perceptual Errors 0.026 Yes 0.182 No 
Adverse Mental States Perceptual  Errors 0.001 Yes 0.091 No 
Adverse Mental States Routine violation 0.026 Yes 0.182 No 
Personal Readiness Perceptual Errors 0.001 Yes  0.091 No 
Personal Readiness Routine Violations 0.026 Yes  0.182 No  
*Only Significant P-values are shown. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  
*Spearman’s Correlation Summary Results of HFACS-OGI framework 
Strength of association between upper level and adjacent 
downward level categories in the HFACS-OGI framework.  
Spearman’s Correlation 
Coefficient Significance Level of 
Significance 
National Regulatory 
Framework 
Organizational Climate 0.690 0.019 0.05 
Management of Change Inadequate Supervision 0.828 0.002 0.01 
Inadequate supervision Technological environment 0.624 0.040 0.05 
Inadequate supervision Crew Resource 
Management 
0.690 0.019 0.05 
Planned inappropriate 
operations 
Physical Environment 0.671 0.024 0.05 
Failed to Correct Known 
Problem 
Physical Environment 1.0000 . 0.01 
Physical Environment Skill-Based Errors 1.0000 . 0.01 
Technological Environment Perceptual Errors 0.671 0.024 0.05 
Adverse Mental States Perceptual Errors 1.0000 . 0.01 
Adverse Mental States Routine Violations 0.671 0.024 0.05 
Personal Readiness Perceptual Errors 1.0000 . 0.01 
Personal Readiness Routine Violations 0.671 0.024 0.05 
*Only Significant P-values are shown. 
 
The path of association shows it is possible for advanced mental stress and inadequate personal 
preparation to create the conditions for routine violations. It is possible for both the technological environment 
and adverse mental states to create the conditions for significant errors.  
This current study was based on a very limited number of publicly available refinery accident/incident 
reports between 1998 and 2012 suffering at least one fatality or extensive damage to the facility. These were 
retrieved from the CSB accident database. A more comprehensive analysis using the HFACS-OGI would have 
been possible had a larger and more varied report been used. The use of only publicly available 
accident/incident reports from the CSB accident database also limits the conclusions that can be drawn from 
this analysis; as the sample size may not adequately represent the full range of possible accident causal factors 
in the oil and gas industry. However, although this is a representative sample, the result clearly showed that 
HFAC-OGI was useful in identifying unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, 
organisational influences and regulatory and statutory influences in the oil and gas industry. To reiterate, 
although the sample size is recognised as a limitation, this limitation does not undermine the re- search 
outcomes and the potential application of this method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Paths of associations between HFACS-OGI levels  
                                      (Chi-square Test                  Fisher’s Exact Test                ) 
 
 5. Conclusions  
  This study proposed the HFACS-OGI framework to address the short- comings in the original HFACS 
framework for the oil and gas industry. HFACS-OGI was successfully applied to the oil and gas industry 
context with a special focus on refinery accidents in the USA. The HFACS-OGI analysis identified 
significant themes in the 11 re- finery accidents analysed to validate its efficiency of application in the oil 
and gas industry. Some of the significant themes include the national regulatory framework, industry 
standards, management of change, the contractor environment and the process safety culture. International 
standards and the national regulatory framework were identified as contributing to accident causation in the 
oil and gas industry. These identified themes were not in the original HFACS but were identified using the 
HFACS-OGI showing the greater efficiency and robustness of the HFACS-OGI. The statistical analysis of 
associations between the different levels identified important relationships such as level 5 categories having 
some association with the organisational climate and supervision having influence on some level 2 
categories such as the technological environment and crew resource management. These findings 
0.022 
Management of 
Change 
Process Safety 
Culture 
Industry 
Standards 
National 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Resource 
Management 
Organisational 
Climate 
Organisational 
Process 
Supervisory 
Violation 
Planned 
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Operations 
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Supervision 
Failed to Correct 
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Decision 
Errors 
Skill-based 
Errors 
Perpetual 
 Errors 
Routine 
Violations 
Exceptional 
Violations 
 Level 5 
 Level 4 
 Level 3 
Level 2 
 Level 1 
Physical 
Environment 
Contractor                 
Environment 
 
Technological 
Environment 
Adverse 
mental 
states 
Physical      
mental 
limitations 
Adverse 
physiological 
states 
Crew 
resource 
management 
Personal 
readiness 
0.006   
0.001 0.026 0.039 
0.022 
0.001 0.026 0.026 0.001 
0.026 
0.015   
0.001 
 
Acts of 
Sabotage 
demonstrate the efficiency and applicability of HFACS-OGI as an important HSE tool for the analysis of 
accidents in the oil and gas industry. 
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